Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
Cardozo Law Review de•novo

Scholarship

2019

Effective Assistance of Counsel? An Empirical Study of Defense
Attorneys’ Decision-Making in False-Confession Cases
Sara C. Appleby
CUNY Graduate Center

Hadley R. McCartin
Mercer University

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/de-novo
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Appleby, Sara C. and McCartin, Hadley R., "Effective Assistance of Counsel? An Empirical Study of
Defense Attorneys’ Decision-Making in False-Confession Cases" (2019). Cardozo Law Review de•novo.
69.
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/de-novo/69

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cardozo Law Review de•novo by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For
more information, please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu.

de•novo

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL? AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DEFENSE ATTORNEYS’
DECISION-MAKING IN FALSE-CONFESSION CASES
Sara C. Appleby† & Hadley R. McCartin*

Although there is considerable literature on the causes of false confessions
and the effects confession evidence has on juror decision-making, little research has
examined attorneys’ decision-making in disputed confession cases. As the
intervening step between when the confession is elicited and the case is resolved, it
is crucial that research examine effects of confession evidence on this population.
The current studies investigate defense attorneys’ knowledge and perception of key
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interrogation and confession issues as well as their decision-making in a disputed
confession case. Overall, results show that defense attorneys are knowledgeable
about key interrogation and confession issues and are aware of how powerful
confession evidence is at trial. Regarding trial strategies, however, defense
attorneys focused more on highlighting the lack of non-confession evidence than
discounting the confession. Implications for future research and practice are
discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Confessions from perpetrators help solve crimes in an efficient
manner, eliminating strain on an overburdened criminal justice system.
However, approximately 13% to 30% of all DNA exoneration cases
involve confessions from innocent suspects.1 Even though the courts have
implemented numerous safeguards to ensure that confessions are
voluntary, research shows that, when exposed to standard police
interrogation techniques, innocent suspects are vulnerable to confessing
to crimes they did not commit.2 Furthermore, once confession cases
proceed to trial, confession evidence is so powerful that the defendant
stands little chance of being acquitted,3 and even exculpatory DNA
evidence is not always powerful enough to surmount confession evidence
at trial.4 Although there is considerable literature on the causes of false
confessions and on the effects confessions have on mock jurors, no
empirical research to date has examined attorneys’—neither prosecution
nor defense—knowledge and perceptions of interrogations and
confession issues, nor their decision-making in disputed-confession
cases. As the intervening step between when the confession is made and
the case is tried, it is crucial that researchers examine the effects of
confession evidence on these populations. The current study reports

1 See Brandon L Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1052
(2010);
Exoneration
Statistics
and
Databases,
INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://
www.innocenceproject.org/exoneration-statistics-and-databases [https://perma.cc/7DXE-G99M] ;
Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2010).
2 See Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 14–23.
3 See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: An
Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 475–
76 (1997); Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental
Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 35–36 (1997); Saul M. Kassin &
Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Prior Confessions and Mock Juror Verdicts, 10 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 133, 140–43 (1980).
4 See Sara C. Appleby & Saul M. Kassin, When Self-Report Trumps Science: Effects of
Confessions, DNA, and Prosecutorial Theories on Perceptions of Guilt, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 127, 132–34 (2016).
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relevant defense attorney data taken from a larger study of prosecution
and defense attorneys regarding disputed confessions.
II. THE PROBLEM OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
Standard police interrogation procedures can lead people to confess
to crimes they did not commit.5 In fact, of the Innocence Project’s 367
documented DNA exonerations, confessions were a contributing cause in
27.8% (n = 102) of cases.6 Although it is impossible to know the precise
rate of false confessions, recent estimates suggest that they are a
contributing factor in 13% to 30% of all post-conviction DNA
exonerations.7 This number, however, only represents the tip of the
iceberg of false confessions, as many cases may not have exculpatory
DNA evidence, may be dismissed before trial, may be minor crimes that
are not heavily scrutinized, or may be juvenile offenses for which records
are sealed.8
Researchers have identified two main reasons why people confess
to crimes they did not commit: dispositional vulnerabilities and
situational pressures.9 Dispositional vulnerabilities include the suspect’s
age, mental illness, intellectual impairment, and certain personality
characteristics that relate to compliance and suggestibility.10 Situational
pressures include the inherent pressure of an interrogation, the length of
the interrogation, and a number of specific tactics used by police officers
during the interrogation.11

5 Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the
Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 48–50 (2004).
6 DNA
Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://
www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/CQR9HATE].
7 See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1052; Exoneration Statistics and Databases, supra note 1;
Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 4; see also Samuel Gross and Maurice Possley, For 50 Years, You’ve
Had “The Right to Remain Silent”, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (June 12, 2016), http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/false-confessions-.aspx [https://perma.cc/NT565AYY].
8 Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 3.
9 Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 5, at 51–56; Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 16–22.
10 Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 5, at 51; see GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 360–414 (2003).
11 Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform, 17
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 249, 250–51 (2008); see RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 195–236 (2009).
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Dispositional Vulnerabilities

Under enough pressure anyone is at risk of confessing to a crime
they did not commit, but certain groups of people are more vulnerable
than others. These groups include juvenile suspects, intellectually
disabled suspects, and mentally ill suspects.
1.

Suspect Age

An analysis of the first 215 DNA exonerations found that more than
one-third of DNA exonerees were between the ages of fourteen and
twenty-two when they were arrested, and together spent 947 years in jail
for crimes they did not commit.12 Of these 215 DNA exonerations,
approximately 25% of innocent defendants made incriminating
statements, confessed, or pled guilty, largely as a result of police
pressure.13
A review of known false-confession cases has shown juveniles to be
particularly susceptible to the pressures of interrogation. A later
examination of 340 exonerations showed that 42% of juvenile suspects
falsely confessed (compared to 13% percent of adults); and of these
juvenile cases, 69% of the youngest juveniles—those aged twelve to
fifteen—falsely confessed.14 In sum, age is a significant risk factor for
false confession.15
Three key reasons why juveniles are over-represented in falseconfession cases are (1) lack of knowledge, (2) lower cognitive ability,

12 947 Years They Can Never Get Back, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Apr. 2, 2008), https://
www.innocenceproject.org/947-years-they-can-never-get-back [https://perma.cc/VMQ5-RYJP].
13 See All Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#falseconfessions-or-admissions,custom-exonorate-year-1989,custom-exonorate-year-1990,customexonorate-year-1991,custom-exonorate-year-1992,custom-exonorate-year-1993,customexonorate-year-1994,custom-exonorate-year-1995,custom-exonorate-year-1996,customexonorate-year-1997,custom-exonorate-year-1998,custom-exonorate-year-1999,customexonorate-year-2000,custom-exonorate-year-2001,custom-exonorate-year-2002,customexonorate-year-2003,custom-exonorate-year-2004,custom-exonorate-year-2005,customexonorate-year-2006,custom-exonorate-year-2007 [https://perma.cc/SP33-X8Y6].
14 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545 (2005).
15 SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 59 (2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
U4KY-CTHG]; Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 963 (2004); Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking
Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 141, 148 (2003).
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and (3) lower psycho-social maturity.16 For example, numerous studies
show that suspects under the age of fifteen are unable to fully understand
their Miranda rights.17 Similarly, adolescents under the age of sixteen
have been shown to have reduced cognitive abilities as compared to
adults.18
Cognitive ability, however, is merely one aspect of judgment and
decision-making.19 Developmental psychologists argue that while
cognitive capacity shapes the process of making a decision, the psychosocial factors—such as impulse control and future planning—affect the
outcome of the decision.20 For example, an adolescent who possesses
average to above-average intelligence may have the cognitive capability
to make a decision, such as the one to waive her Miranda rights, but may
also have a tendency to discount the future and weigh short-term rewards
more heavily than long-term consequences, especially when the gains are
more immediate.21 This can lead a juvenile suspect to favor falsely
confessing in order to end an unpleasant interrogation (short-term
reward) over the risk of being tried and convicted of a crime (long-term
consequence).
2.

Mental Impairment

In addition to juveniles, people with intellectual disabilities and
mental illnesses are over-represented in false-confession cases.22 Twentyeight of the 125 proven false-confession cases analyzed by Drizin and
Leo involved individuals with intellectual disabilities—a number that is
16 Cf. Lawrence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 476–77 (2009) (showing these factors affected a study’s results on
juvenile competence to stand trial).
17 See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 73–75 (1981); Allison D. Redlich et al., Pre-Adjudicative and Adjudicative
Competence in Juveniles and Young Adults, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393, 399–406 (2003); Naomi E.
Sevin Goldstein et al., Juvenile Offenders’ Miranda Rights Comprehension and Self-Reported
Likelihood of Offering False Confessions, 10 ASSESSMENT 359, 364 (2003); Jodi L. Viljoen et al.,
Adjudicative Competence and Comprehension of Miranda Rights in Adolescent Defendants: A
Comparison of Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1, 9–11 (2007).
18 Steinberg, supra note 16, at 479.
19 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011 (2003).
20 See id. at 1012.
21 See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 18–19 (1992); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age
Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 36 (2009).
22 Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 19; see GUDJONSSON, supra note 10, at 316–19; Kassin &
Gudjonsson, supra note 5, at 49.
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likely an undercount, as intelligence test results were not available in the
majority of cases.23 Like juveniles, people with intellectual disabilities
show poor comprehension and application of their Miranda rights24 and
of the consequences of confession.25 Specifically, people with mental
retardation have been shown to think that having an attorney will
negatively affect their case26 and that their confession could be easily
retracted.27 In addition to poor comprehension of the legal system, people
with intellectual disabilities show increased suggestibility28 and
compliance with authority figures.29 This increased susceptibility to
social pressures, combined with a decreased understanding of the
complex legal proceedings going on around them, creates a perfect storm
of risk factors for false confession.
Similarly, a study of 1249 offenders with serious mental illness in
the United States found that nearly a quarter of respondents reported
having falsely confessed to crimes they did not commit.30 People with
mental illness often show distorted perception and reality monitoring
along with poor judgement and self-control, all of which can increase the
risk of false confession.31 Additionally, like those with intellectual
disabilities, people with psychotic disorders show decreased

Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 971 & n.452.
Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring
Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL
RETARDATION 212, 216 (1999); Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Mental Retardation,
Competency to Waive Miranda Rights, and False Confessions, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS,
AND ENTRAPMENT 163, 172 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004); Michael J. O’Connell et al., Miranda
Comprehension in Adults with Mental Retardation and the Effects of Feedback Style on
Suggestibility, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359, 367 (2005).
25 Isabel C.H. Clare & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Vulnerability of Suspects with Intellectual
Disabilities During Police Interviews: A Review and Experimental Study of Decision-Making, 8
MENTAL HANDICAP RES. 110, 119–21 (1995).
26 See Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 557 (2002).
27 See Clare & Gudjonsson, supra note 25, at 120–21.
28 Everington & Fulero, supra note 24, at 217; see also Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Lucy Henry,
Child and Adult Witnesses with Intellectual Disability: The Importance of Suggestibility, 8 LEGAL
& CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 245 (2003).
29 See Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice-Related Competencies
in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 483, 489–90 (1994).
30 Allison D. Redlich et al., Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas Among
Offenders with Mental Illness, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 79, 83 (2010).
31 See GUDJONSSON, supra note 10, at 317; Allison D. Redlich, Mental Illness, Police
Interrogations, and the Potential for False Confession, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 19, 20 (2004); see
also Deborah Davis & William T. O’Donohue, The Road to Perdition: Extreme Influence Tactics
in the Interrogation Room, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 897, 963–67 (William
O’Donohue & Eric Levensky eds., 2004).
23
24
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understanding of their constitutional rights,32 and people with autism
show increased compliance with authority figures.33 Taken together, the
research on juveniles, people with intellectual disabilities, and people
with mental illness show that, due to reduced cognitive capacities and
increased susceptibility to social pressures, the standard police
interrogation puts many suspects at risk for false confession.
B.

Situational Pressures

The standard police interrogation not only puts suspects from
vulnerable populations at risk of falsely confessing, but it also puts
average adults at risk of doing so. While vulnerable populations are overrepresented in false-confession cases, there are many documented cases
of psychologically normal adults falsely confessing. To understand how
this can happen, one must understand the standard police interrogation.
A police interrogation is typically a two-step process.34 Police first
conduct a pre-interrogation interview, a non-confrontational process
which aims at determining whether a suspect is innocent or guilty. For
the suspect, this police-citizen interaction is often the critical moment that
determines whether she will be subject to further interrogation.35
Unfortunately, police officers often make mistakes when attempting to
establish veracity. In fact, police officers consistently obtain hit rates near
chance, and are not more accurate than lay people in detecting
deception.36 To this end, innocent suspects are sometimes interrogated
for crimes they did not commit and placed in situations that increase their
risk of falsely confessing. Once a suspect has been identified as guilty,
the interrogation begins. The interrogation is an accusatorial process
during which investigators try to elicit a confession from a suspect they
already believe to be guilty.37 A false confession is thus the result of
incorrect veracity assessments in step one of the interrogation and of the

32 Jodi L. Viljoen et al., An Examination of the Relationship Between Competency to Stand
Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights, and Psychopathology, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
481, 492–93 (2002).
33 Alice S. North et al., High Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders: An Investigation of
Psychological Vulnerabilities During Interrogative Interview, 19 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY &
PSYCHOL. 323, 328–31 (2008).
34 See FRED EDWARD INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 3–7 (5th
ed. 2013).
35 Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 5, at 36.
36 See ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES 160 (2d
ed. 2008); Aldert Vrij et al., Pitfalls and Opportunities in Nonverbal and Verbal Lie Detection, 11
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 89, 101–02 (2010).
37 See GUDJONSSON, supra note 10, at 10; Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 6–7.
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subsequent exposure of innocent suspects to manipulative and
psychologically coercive interrogation techniques in step two.38
The effectiveness of these commonly employed interrogation
techniques in accomplishing the goal of eliciting confessions is
undisputed. Some examples of commonly employed interrogation
techniques include custody and isolation, excessive use of time, lying and
bluffing about evidence, and the use of themes that minimize the
seriousness of the crime and thus imply leniency.39
1.

Custody and Isolation

Popular police interrogation manuals (e.g., the Reid Technique)
advise isolating the suspect in a small windowless room.40 The goal of
this isolation is to create an uncomfortable situation that the suspect is
eager to get out of—and the only way to do so is to confess. Although
isolation is effective at eliciting true confessions, it can also lead innocent
suspects to confess when used in conjunction with other tactics.41
According to surveys of North American police officers, the average
police interrogation lasts an average of 1.60 hours,42 and the Reid
Technique advises practitioners not to exceed four hours.43 Legally,
however, there is no time limit on interrogations.44 Consequently, an
analysis of 125 proven false-confession cases found that, for cases in
which interrogation time was recorded, the mean interrogation length was
16.3 hours, with 34% lasting six to twelve hours and 39% lasting twelve
to twenty-four hours.45 Basic psychological research shows that
prolonged periods of isolation are stressful46 and can incentivize people
to take actions to remove themselves from the source of the stress,47 even
those that go against self-interest like falsely confessing to a crime. In

38 See Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform,
17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 249, 250 (2008).
39 LEO, supra note 11, at 134–62; Kassin, supra note 38, at 250–51. For a full review, see
Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 16–19.
40 INBAU ET AL., supra note 34, at 47.
41 Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?,
60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 221 (2005); Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 16.
42 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police
Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 392 (2007).
43 INBAU ET AL., supra note 34, at 347.
44 See id. (“The length at which an interrogation approaches the level of duress associated with
an involuntary confession is individually defined.”); see also Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 28.
45 Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 948–49.
46 Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 16.
47 Id.
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sum, research has shown that as the negative effects of a situation become
more extreme, escape motives become central to behavior.48
For example, consider the case of Todd Johnson. On December 19,
1998, at approximately 3:30 AM, the police arrived at Mr. Johnson’s
home to investigate the death of his wife.49 Once there, the police had Mr.
Johnson sit in the police car until around 7:00 AM, at which point they
transported him to the local police station. Once at the police station,
investigators began interrogating Mr. Johnson.50 Between 9:15 PM and
10:00 PM on December 19, 1998, Mr. Johnson signed a typed statement,
after nearly nineteen hours of a constant police presence and nearly
fifteen hours of interrogation.51 This length of time, by all accounts, is
extreme, and likely contributed to Mr. Johnson’s false confession.52
Hand-in-hand with lengthy interrogations comes sleep deprivation.
Basic psychological research shows that sleep deprivation can impair
cognitive function and decision-making ability,53 making it difficult for
sleep-deprived suspects to resist the social pressures inherent in a police
interrogation. Both laboratory and field studies show reduced cognitive
function and increased susceptibility to social influence as a result of
sleep deprivation. For example, studies of medical interns,54 motorists,55

48 Craig A. Anderson, Temperature and Aggression: Ubiquitous Effects of Heat on Occurrence
of Human Violence, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 75 (1989).
49 See Statement of Todd M. Johnson to Kansas City Police Department at 3 (Dec. 19, 1998)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Johnson Statement] (explaining Johnson arrived home around
3:00 AM and called the police after finding his wife dead).
50 See Murdered Woman’s Parents Win $30M Vs. Son-in-Law—Husband Was Acquitted in
Criminal Trial, MO. LAW. WKLY. (June 7, 2004) [hereinafter Parents Win $30M], https://
molawyersmedia.com/2004/06/07/murdered-womans-parents-win-30m-vs-soninlaw-husbandwas-acquitted-in-criminal-trial [https://perma.cc/6PBS-ZQGF] (noting police began interrogating
Johnson at the police station around 7:30 AM).
51 Johnson Statement, supra note 49, at 1 (noting the statement was taken at 9:15 PM); Kassin
supra note 41, at 224; see Kassin, supra note 41, at 224; Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin,
Inside Interrogation: The Lie, the Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 327, 328–
29 (2010); see also Parents Win $30M, supra note 50.
52 Parents Win $30M, supra note 50 (“[A] defense expert testified that Johnson had been
suffering from sleep deprivation and was unable to think clearly when he wrote out his confession.
The jury acquitted Johnson in a December 2001 trial.”).
53 June J. Pilcher & Allen I. Huffcutt, Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Performance: A MetaAnalysis, 19 SLEEP 318, 321–25 (1996); see also Yvonne Harrison & James A. Horne, The Impact
of Sleep Deprivation on Decision Making: A Review, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 236, 241–45
(2000).
54 Matthew B. Weinger & Sonia Ancoli-Israel, Sleep Deprivation and Clinical Performance,
287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 955 (2002); see Sigrid Veasey et al., Sleep Loss and Fatigue in Residency
Training, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1116, 1121–22 (2002).
55 See James M. Lyznicki et al., Sleepiness, Driving, and Motor Vehicle Crashes, 279 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1908, 1909 (1998).
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and fighter pilots56 all show performance impairments as a result of sleep
deprivation.
Recently, laboratory experiments have extended these findings to
interrogations specifically. Combining standard laboratory paradigms for
studying false confessions with standard sleep research, a group of
researchers showed that sleep-deprived participants were significantly
more likely to falsely confess (50%) than non-sleep-deprived participants
(18%).57 Returning to the case of Todd Johnson, as noted above, the
police arrived at Mr. Johnson’s home around 3:30 AM on December 19.
By all accounts, Mr. Johnson had been awake since around 9:00 AM on
December 18; thus, by the time Mr. Johnson had signed his statement at
10:00 PM on December 19, he had been awake for nearly thirty-seven
hours. At this point, there is no question that Mr. Johnson was sleep
deprived and at increased risk of falsely confessing.
2.

Minimization and False Evidence

In addition to isolating the suspect, there are specific
psychologically coercive maneuvers that police use during the
interrogation that put innocent suspects at risk of falsely confessing.58 It
is important to note that these techniques are all considered non-coercive
in the eyes of the law since they do not involve physical force, explicit
threats or promises, or deprivations of any kind.59 Furthermore, the courts
assume that innocent suspects—from non-vulnerable populations—will
not confess when exposed to these legal interrogation techniques.
Laboratory research on these techniques, however, shows this not to be
the case.60
One way interrogators attempt to convince the suspect that it is in
her best interest to confess is to try to change the perceived consequences
of confessing (or continuing to deny) without outright promising leniency
to or threatening the suspect, commonly referred to “minimization” and

56 John A. Caldwell et al., The Effects of 37 Hours of Continuous Wakefulness on the
Physiological Arousal, Cognitive Performance, Self-Reported Mood, and Simulator Flight
Performance of F-117A Pilots, 16 MIL. PSYCHOL. 163, 169–70 (2004).
57 Steven J. Frenda et al., Sleep Deprivation and False Confessions, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. 2047, 2048 (2016).
58 See Kassin, supra note 41, at 219–22.
59 See id. at 222; see also Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 11 (noting the U.S. Supreme Court has
“designate[d] certain interrogation methods—including physical force, threats of harm or
punishment, lengthy or incommunicado questioning, solitary confinement, denial of food or sleep,
and promises of leniency—as presumptively coercive and therefore unconstitutional”).
60 See Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 16–19.
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“maximization,” respectively.61 Maximization involves the use of scare
tactics and is designed to communicate the interrogator’s belief in the
suspect’s guilt and that there will be harsher consequences for repeated
denials.62 In contrast, minimization is designed to reduce the anxiety
associated with confession by normalizing and minimizing the moral
seriousness of the offense.63 This tactic, while effective at obtaining true
confessions, also puts innocent suspects at risk to make false confessions
by implying leniency.64 The use of minimization has been shown to
increase the rate of false confessions.65 Importantly, observers do not
view the use of minimization tactics during interrogation as coercive.66
Of the permissible interrogation tactics, one of the most
controversial is the false-evidence ploy, in which interrogators tell the
suspect they have evidence of her guilt (e.g., DNA, blood, an eyewitness,
or a failed polygraph) when that evidence does not really exist. Police
training manuals, such as the Reid Technique,67 recommend using this
tactic under certain circumstances, and police officers report sometimes
using it.68 Lying about evidence has been shown to increase false
confession rates by making suspects feel trapped or by making suspects
doubt their own memory.69
An alternative to the false-evidence ploy is the bluff. Here, police
pretend to have evidence in the case but do not claim that it implicates
the suspect; for example, the police might say, “We have DNA that we
are going to test.” The bluff has been shown to increase the rate of false
61 See Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions:
Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233,
233 (1991).
62 Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth About False Confessions and Advocacy
Scholarship, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 293, 365 (2001); Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and
False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481, 482 (2005).
63 See Russano et al., supra note 62, at 482; see also Leo & Ofshe, supra note 62, at 365.
64 See Allyson J. Horgan et al., Minimization and Maximization Techniques: Assessing the
Perceived Consequences of Confessing and Confession Diagnosticity, 18 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L.
65, 75 (2011); Jessica R. Klaver et al., Effects of Personality, Interrogation Techniques and
Plausibility in an Experimental False Confession Paradigm, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 71, 79 (2010); Fadia M. Narchet et al., Modeling the Influence of Investigator Bias on
the Elicitation of True and False Confessions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 452, 453 (2011); Russano
et al., supra note 62, at 484.
65 Klaver et al., supra note 64, at 79; Russano et al., supra note 62, at 484.
66 Kassin & McNall, supra note 61, at 238.
67 INBAU ET AL., supra note 34, at 172–73.
68 Kassin et al., supra note 42, at 394.
69 See Robert Horselenberg et al., Individual Differences and False Confessions: A Conceptual
Replication of Kassin and Kiechel, 9 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 1, 5 (2003); Saul M. Kassin &
Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, Internalization,
and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 127 (1996); Redlich & Goodman, supra note 15, at 149–
50.
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confessions by paradoxically playing on a suspect’s trust in the power of
his innocence to prevail, thereby anticipating future exoneration from the
alleged evidence.70 However, because this evidence does not exist, the
suspect cannot be exonerated and has now confessed to the crime in
question. In sum, police interrogation methods are skillfully designed to
elicit confessions through a number of channels, but they are nondiagnostic and can often elicit confessions from innocent suspects as well
as guilty suspects.
III. THE POWER OF CONFESSION EVIDENCE
Once a confession case goes to trial, the odds of conviction are very
high, as demonstrated by both real-world examples and laboratory
research. When false confessors plead “not guilty” and proceed to trial,
conviction rates range from 73%71 to 81%.72 Notably, approximately 85%
of the convictions occurred when there was little or no corroborating
evidence, when the confessions were inconsistent, or when they were
contradicted by other evidence.73
Results of controlled laboratory studies confirm the tremendous
impact of confession evidence implied by these real-world examples.
Confession evidence has been found to increase mock jurors’ conviction
rates and probability-of-commission ratings more than both eyewitness
testimony and character testimony across a variety of different crimes.74
Jurors even favor confession evidence over exculpatory DNA evidence
when the prosecution offers an explanatory theory for the contradictory
evidence, as compared to when no explanation is presented.75
Furthermore, the presence of a confession increases mock jurors’
conviction rates and probability-of-commission ratings over a noconfession control group, even when the confession was elicited by highpressure interrogation tactics or ruled inadmissible by a judge.76 This
effect occurred even when participants claimed not to have considered
the confession as evidence.77 The presence of a secondary confession—a
confession provided by someone other than the suspect (e.g., a jailhouse
Perillo & Kassin, supra note 51, at 330–31.
E.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 480–81 (1998).
72 E.g., Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 960.
73 Id. at 961.
74 Kassin & Neuman, supra note 3, at 481–82.
75 Appleby & Kassin, supra note 4, at 136–37.
76 Kassin & Sukel, supra note 3, at 42.
77 Id.
70
71
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informant)—has even been shown to increase conviction rates over a nowitness control group.78 Additionally, recanted confessions create
perceptions of guilt, even when the mock jurors are told that the confessor
suffered from mental illness or that the interrogation induced stress.79
Studies on juvenile defendants have found similar results.80
Similar persuasive and biasing effects have been found for judges.
In the only known study looking specifically at judges and their
evaluations of confession evidence, 132 judges from three states read a
confession case and conducted a harmless-error analysis. Although the
judges in the high-pressure condition were able to properly conduct the
harmless-error analysis and judge the confession as coerced, their
perceptions of guilt were not immune from the biasing effects of the
confession. Demonstrating the biasing effect of a confession, the judges
in the high-pressure interrogation condition, as compared to the noconfession control group, convicted more often and rated the other case
evidence as stronger.81 Thus, it is not just lay people who are swayed by
the power of confessions. If judges are biased by confessions, it stands to
reason that attorneys will fall prey to similar biases in decision-making.
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS
Once a defendant has confessed—and if the defendant disputes the
confession—the defendant’s fate is in the hands of attorneys, judges, and
juries. Thus, it is important to know what fact finders know and
understand about interrogations and confessions. The majority of
research in this domain has focused on what lay people—i.e., potential
jurors—know about the subject matter. The results suggest that the
average juror is relatively uninformed. For example, a survey of potential
jurors found that that only 43% of participants knew that police officers
could lie to suspects in an interrogation,82 only 55% knew that they could
downplay the seriousness of a crime,83 and, importantly, only 12% knew
78 Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants
on Jury Decision Making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 141 (2008).
79 Linda A. Henkel, Jurors’ Reactions to Recanted Confessions: Do the Defendant’s Personal
and Dispositional Characteristics Play a Role?, 14 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 565, 570 (2008).
80 See Allison D. Redlich et al., Perceptions of Children During a Police Interrogation: Guilt,
Confessions, and Interview Fairness, 14 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 201, 208–16 (2008); Allison D.
Redlich et al., Perceptions of Children During a Police Interview: A Comparison of Alleged Victims
and Suspects, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 705, 714–21 (2008).
81 D. Brian Wallace & Saul M. Kassin, Harmless Error Analysis: How do Judges Respond to
Confession Errors?, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 153–56 (2012).
82 Danielle E. Chojnacki et al., An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert Testimony on
False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 38 (2008).
83 Id.
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that police officers are not better than lay people at detecting deception.84
Additionally, 81% believed that jurors were not knowledgeable enough
about interrogation tactics and confessions to make informed judgments
about confession evidence at trial.85
Surveys of the perceived coerciveness of interrogation tactics have
shown a similar lack of knowledge. Although potential jurors recognize
police interrogation tactics (e.g., implicit promises of leniency,
presentations of false evidence, and challenging denials) as coercive, they
see them as more likely to elicit true confessions than false ones.86
Very little is known about attorneys’ knowledge and perceptions of
interrogations and confessions. One Swedish study examined
prosecutors’ and judges’ beliefs about deception. The results showed that
prosecutors are relatively uniformed about deception, but that they are
more knowledgeable than police officers on some aspects of deception
detection, such as verbal versus nonverbal cues to deception.87 Compared
to lay people, attorneys’ legal and professional educations presumably
make them more knowledgeable about what police officers can and
cannot do during an interrogation. There are, however, many aspects of
interrogations and confessions (e.g., distinguishing between true and
false confession, and suspect vulnerability) that attorneys may not be
exposed to in law school or even throughout their legal practice; we
therefore anticipate them being no more knowledgeable about these
issues than lay people are. Additionally, attorneys and lay people are
likely to have similar perceptions of the coerciveness of common
interrogation tactics due to a lack of knowledge on the topic and to
general biases in cognition.
Regarding other common causes of wrongful convictions, research
shows that, compared to prosecutors, defense attorneys are more sensitive
to the problems inherent in eyewitness testimony.88 But recent research
suggests this gap in eyewitness knowledge may be closing.89 Eyewitness
testimony has received a considerable amount of attention in psycholegal research—more so than confessions evidence—yet, attorneys are
Id. at 31.
Id. at 43.
86 Iris Blandón-Gitlin et al., Jurors Believe Interrogation Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False
Confessions: Will Expert Witness Testimony Inform Them Otherwise?, 17 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L.
239, 243–48 (2010); Richard A. Leo & Brittany Liu, What do Jurors Know About Police
Interrogation Techniques and False Confessions?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 381, 387–90 (2009).
87 See Leif A. Strömwall & Pär Anders Granhag, How to Detect Deception? Arresting the
Beliefs of Police Officers, Prosecutors and Judges, 9 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 19, 22–28 (2003).
88 Richard A. Wise et al., What US Prosecutors and Defence Attorneys Know and Believe About
Eyewitness Testimony, 23 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1266, 1272 (2009).
89 See Kathy Pezdek & Matthew O’Brien, Plea Bargaining and Appraisals of Eyewitness
Evidence by Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys, 20 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 222, 236 (2013).
84
85
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still relatively uninformed about the numerous factors that influence
eyewitness testimony. This unfamiliarity by attorneys of eyewitness
issues would suggest a similar unfamiliarity of confession issues.
V. THE ROLE OF ATTORNEY KNOWLEDGE AND DECISION-MAKING
Compared to jury decision-making, there is limited research on
attorney decision-making. This is noteworthy because the majority of
cases never make it to trial, with 90% to 95% of all criminal cases in the
United States being settled by plea bargain.90 Stated differently, the
majority of criminal cases in the United States are resolved outside of a
courtroom via negation between attorneys,91 and there is a dearth of
knowledge about how attorneys, who are key actors in the criminal justice
system, evaluate evidence and make decisions.
Research to date suggests that, like jury decisions,92 evidence
strength is the driving factor in attorneys’ plea-bargaining
recommendations.93 Regarding confession cases specifically, available
evidence shows that prosecutors are less likely to initiate a plea bargain,94
tend to charge the defendant with the highest number and types of
offenses,95 and tend to set bail higher96 than in non-confession cases. This
observed decrease in prosecutor-initiated plea bargains in confession
cases suggests that prosecutors are aware of the power of confession
evidence. Specifically, confession evidence is considered the most
powerful non-scientific form of evidence;97 thus, in confession cases,
even when the confession is disputed—and when other evidence is
lacking—prosecutors may be more certain of the case and more willing
90 Pezdek & O’Brien, supra note 89, at 222 (“90% of cases are resolved through plea
bargaining.” (citation omitted)); Allison D. Redlich et al., The Psychology of Defendant Plea
Decision Making, 72 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 339, 339 (2017) (“Roughly 95% of federal and state
convictions . . . result from guilty pleas.”).
91 Pezdek & O’Brien, supra note 89, at 222 (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170
(2012)).
92 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 149–62 (1966)
93 See Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 184 (2007); Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble:
Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 SOC. PROBS. 439, 444 (1979); Pezdek &
O’Brien, supra note 89, at 232–34; see also David Pritchard, Homicide and Bargained Justice: The
Agenda-Setting Effect of Crime News on Prosecutors, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 143, 150 (1986).
94 See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 907–09 (1996).
95 See id. at 909–12.
96 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 907.
97 See Joel D. Lieberman et al., Gold Versus Platinum: Do Jurors Recognize the Superiority
and Limitations of DNA Evidence Compared to Other Types of Forensic Evidence?, 14 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 27, 37 (2008); see also Kassin & Sukel, supra note 3, at 36–37.
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to proceed to trial based on the persuasive power of the confession. The
same available evidence suggests that defense attorneys in confession
cases are more likely to suggest that their clients accept a guilty plea to a
lesser charge.98 There is also evidence, however, that other factors, such
as the defendant’s race99 and prior arrest history,100 as well as attorney
over-confidence,101 can affect plea recommendations.
Research regarding attorneys’ trial strategies is even more limited
than research on plea decisions. Moreover, the little research there is
mostly ignores the factors that lead to wrongful convictions. One study
of how eyewitness testimony affects trial strategy showed that, while
defense attorneys were more aware than prosecutors of the problems
associated with eyewitness testimony, this awareness did not lead to more
interventions during trial, such as filing motions to suppress and calling
eyewitness experts.102 There is no rigorous empirical research, however,
on how criminal attorneys approach disputed-confession cases. Of
particular interest for this paper is (1) how attorneys weigh the manner in
which the confession was obtained, (2) how attorneys weigh pieces of
contradictory evidence in the case, (3) how these factors play into their
decisions to go to trial, and (4) what strategies attorneys pursue at trial
with this information in mind.
A.

Can Attorneys’ Decisions Be Contaminated by Confession
Evidence?

In 2010, the Center for Wrongful Convictions identified nineteen
cases in which confessors to rape or murder were tried and convicted,
despite having been excluded by DNA tests of key biological
materials;103 since that time, additional cases have been reported and
critiqued.104 For example, in New York’s infamous 1989 Central Park
Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 922; see also Leo & Ofshe, supra note 71, at 478–81.
Vanessa A. Edkins, Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does
Zealous Representation Apply Equally to All?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 419 (2011); Besiki
Luka Kutateladze & Victoria Z. Lawson, How Bad Arrests Lead to Bad Prosecution: Exploring
the Impact of Prior Arrests on Plea Bargaining, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 973, 984–87 (2016).
100 Kutateladze & Lawson, supra note 99, at 984.
101 See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 140–41 (2010).
102 Susanne M. Mumby, Preliminary Research on the Evaluation of Eyewitness Testimony by
Defense Attorneys and Prosecutors in Juvenile Transfer Cases 35–36 (Aug. 30, 2014) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, The Chicago School of Professional Psychology) (on file with ProQuest
Dissertations Publishing, Publication No. 3743763).
103 Appleby & Kassin, supra note 4, at 128.
104 E.g., Steven A. Drizin & Hannah Riley, Knox and Sollecito: Victims of a Prosecutor’s
‘Conspiracy Theories’ to Explain Away DNA, HUFFPOST (Feb. 12, 2015, 12:45 PM), https://
98
99
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Jogger case, five teenage boys confessed after lengthy and intense
interrogations.105 DNA testing of the semen recovered from the victim
excluded all five boys before trial,106 yet they were still prosecuted and
convicted,107 with the prosecuting attorneys arguing that there was a sixth
unidentified accomplice that the boys either could not or would not
identify.108 The boys were officially exonerated thirteen years later when
the real perpetrator, a serial rapist who was already in prison, confessed—
a confession that was supported by DNA.109 Cases like these raise
questions about the decisions prosecutors make from the moment they
receive a confession case through the conclusion of the trial. Many have
attributed prosecutors’ decisions to go to trial despite corroborating
evidence, or in the face of exculpatory evidence, to bad intentions or
prosecutorial misconduct.110 However, when dealing with disputedconfession cases, perhaps prosecutors are not being malicious, but are
simply uninformed and falling prey to the many cognitive biases that a
confession sets in motion.
Conversely, in their analysis of 125 proven false confession cases
Drizin and Leo documented fourteen false guilty pleas.111 One infamous
example of a false guilty plea after a false confession is that of
Christopher Ochoa. After confessing to police about his involvement in
a 1988 rape and murder of a fellow Pizza Hut employee, Ochoa, in an
effort to avoid a death sentence, not only pled guilty, but also testified at
trial against his close friend Richard Danzinger—all at the advice of his
attorney. Ochoa and Danzinger were exonerated fourteen years later by
DNA when the real perpetrator, who was already in prison, confessed—
again a confession supported by DNA.112 Research indicates that defense
attorneys are more likely to recommend a plea agreement when the

www.huffpost.com/entry/amanda-knox-and-raffaele_b_4757435 [https://perma.cc/UY5J-UPHU];
Erica Goode, When DNA Evidence Suggests ‘Innocent,’ Some Prosecutors Cling to ‘Maybe’, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/us/dna-evidence-of-innocencerejected-by-some-prosecutors.html [https://perma.cc/SY7Y-98MD]; Andrew Martin, The
Prosecution’s Case Against DNA, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 25, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/
2011/11/27/magazine/dna-evidence-lake-county.html [https://perma.cc/8W4A-JYGX].
105 SARAH BURNS, THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE: A CHRONICLE OF A CITY WILDING 28–65 (2011).
106 Id. at 95–97, 103, 113–14.
107 Id. at 129–77.
108 Id. at 124.
109 Id. at 188–93.
110 See Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 512, 515 (2007).
111 Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 957.
112 Christopher Ochoa, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/
christopher-ochoa [https://perma.cc/5QXZ-QUUM].
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incriminating evidence against the defendant is strong.113 When the
defendant is innocent, however, it raises the question of whether this is
simply a cost-benefit analysis or whether defense attorneys are also
falling prey to the cognitive biases that a confession sets in motion,
potentially overlooking contradictory or exculpatory evidence and
presuming guilt.
A number of social-cognitive factors are likely to contribute to the
persuasive power of a confession through mental contamination. Mental
contamination is the process whereby a person makes an unwanted
judgment as the result of highly adaptive unconscious or uncontrollable
mental processes gone awry and, even if she is aware of this, is unable to
fully correct her judgment.114 For example, teachers do not necessarily
want to give higher grades to more attractive students, and may even try
not to, but numerous studies have found a similar halo effect in many
domains.115 Although there are a number of automatic mental processes
that can contribute to mental contamination, the one most likely at play
in the problem of false confessions is called the “initial acceptance of
propositions,” which includes both the truth bias and the fundamental
attribution error.116
The truth bias is the tendency to believe a proposition, independent
of the statement’s actual veracity.117 This effect occurs even when there
is no evidence to support the statements118 and even when the statements
are clearly labeled as false.119 This happens when people initially accept
the statements as true in an effort to comprehend them, but then fail to
discount or disbelieve the information—if necessary—once it has been
113 Greg M. Kramer et al., Plea Bargaining Recommendations by Criminal Defense Attorneys:
Evidence Strength, Potential Sentence, and Defendant Preference, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 573, 579
(2007).
114 Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 119–22 (1994).
115 See, e.g., William H. Cooper, Ubiquitous Halo, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 218, 219–20 (1981);
David Landy & Harold Sigall, Beauty is Talent: Task Evaluation as a Function of the Performer’s
Physical Attractiveness, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 299, 301–04 (1974).
116 See Wilson & Brekke, supra note 114, at 127.
117 VRIJ, supra note 36, at 148; Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception
Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 217 (2006); Timothy R. Levine et al.,
Deception Detection Accuracy is a Predictable Linear Function of Message Veracity Base-Rate:
A Formal Test of Park and Levine’s Probability Model, 73 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 243, 245 (2006).
118 See Hal R. Arkes et al., The Generality of the Relation Between Familiarity and Judged
Validity, 2 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 81, 84–85 (1989) (“[R]epetition influences validity
ratings identically whether the statement is initially perceived to be true, false, or neutral.”); see
also Daniel T. Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 107, 111 (1991) (“Not only
does doubt seem to be the last operation to emerge, but it also seems to be the first to disappear.”).
119 Daniel T. Gilbert et al., You Can’t Not Believe Everything You Read, 65 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 221, 230 (1993); Daniel M. Wegner et al., The Transparency of Denial: Briefing
in the Debriefing Paradigm, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 338, 342–44 (1985).
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processed.120 The truth bias is likely to be magnified in the case of a
confession because of a strong tendency, as noted by many attribution
theorists, for people to trust statements against self-interest.121 As a result,
people are more likely to believe a suspect’s admissions of guilt than her
denials.122 The truth bias suggests that once people hear a confession, they
will tend to believe it, even when evidence suggests they should not.
A second way to explain the persuasive nature of a confession is the
fundamental attribution error,123 or correspondence bias.124 The
fundamental attribution error is the pervasive tendency to underestimate
the impact of the situation on a person’s behavior and, consequently, to
attribute the behavior to dispositional factors. The fundamental
attribution error often stems from an initial quick attribution of personal
factors to the actor’s behavior, and then a failure to correct or adjust for
situational factors.125
A great deal of research on the fundamental attribution error shows
that, for a number of reasons, it is a hard tendency to overcome. This
includes the invisibility problem, which states that observers have trouble
seeing an actor’s situation as that actor sees it (e.g., a coercive
interrogation), impairing their ability to consider how the situation
influenced the actor’s decisions.126 A good example of the invisibility
problem in the problem of false confessions can be seen in a study by
Kassin and McNall on the impact of commonly used interrogation tactics.
Results showed that when a popular interrogation technique was used
(minimization), outside observers viewed it as non-coercive, viewed the
interrogator as friendlier and less eager for a confession, and viewed the
situation as less coercive overall. Participants also estimated that
relatively few suspects, especially innocent suspects, would confess to
the crime.127 These results suggest both jurors and legal professionals
may be falling prey to the invisibility problem when assessing an
interrogation and the subsequent false confession, making them prone to
committing the fundamental attribution error.
Gilbert et al., supra note 119, at 224.
E.g., Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process
in Person Perception, 2 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 246 (1965).
122 Timothy R. Levine et al., (In)accuracy at Detecting True and False Confessions and
Denials: An Initial Test of a Projected Motive Model of Veracity Judgments, 36 HUM. COMM. RES.
82, 90 (2010).
123 Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, 10 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 184 (1977).
124 Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21,
22 (1995).
125 See Gilbert et al., supra note 119, at 230–31.
126 Gilbert & Malone, supra note 124, at 25.
127 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 61, at 238–39.
120
121
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Another way in which judgment becomes contaminated is through
biased hypothesis testing, a form of confirmation bias by which people
seek, interpret, and create information in ways that support their prior
beliefs.128 This process can occur in two ways. First, when a perceiver
forms an initial impression and then hears ambiguous evidence, they
often seek information confirming their hypothesis.129 Secondly, when
information that does not confirm the perceiver’s position is brought to
their attention, it is either ignored,130 discounted,131 assimilated,132 or
recalled in a manner that supports their initial position.133 This process of
biased hypothesis testing would suggest that once a confession has been
introduced, subsequent evaluations of other evidence may be distorted or
discounted, providing further evidence in the mind of the fact finder that
the defendant committed the crime.
An analysis of 241 DNA exoneration cases showed that confession
cases, compared to eyewitness cases, were more likely to contain multiple
evidentiary errors, and, in these cases, the confessions were more likely
to be taken first, rather than later in the investigation.134 Although the
mechanism of influence is not known in these anecdotal cases, laboratory
research has shown how confessions can change other case evidence.
When fingerprint experts were re-presented with pairs of fingerprints
from a previous case and told either that the suspect had confessed
(suggesting guilt) or was in custody at the time of the crime (suggesting
innocence), these experts changed their previously correct decisions
almost 17% of the time.135 Similarly, Hasel and Kassin found that upon
hearing that a suspect had confessed, nearly 61% of eyewitnesses
changed their lineup identification choices to the reported confessor, and

128 See Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social
Interaction., 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1210 (1978).
129 See id.
130 See Susan M. Belmore, Determinants of Attention During Impression Formation, 13 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 480, 486 (1987).
131 See James A. Kulik, Confirmatory Attribution and the Perpetuation of Social Beliefs, 44 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1171, 1175 (1983); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2101–05 (1979).
132 See David L. Hamilton & Mark P. Zanna, Context Effects in Impression Formation: Changes
in Connotative Meaning, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 649, 652–53 (1974); Teresa
Hayden & Walter Mischel, Maintaining Trait Consistency in the Resolution of Behavioral
Inconsistency: The Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 44 J. PERSONALITY 109, 126–30 (1976).
133 See William B. Swann, Jr. & Stephen J. Read, Acquiring Self-Knowledge: The Search for
Feedback That Fits, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1119, 1124 (1981).
134 Saul M. Kassin et al., Confessions That Corrupt: Evidence From the DNA Exoneration Case
Files, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 41, 42–43 (2011).
135 Itiel E. Dror and David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
600, 610 (2006).
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50% of initial non-choosers changed their decision and chose the
confessor.136 Kukucka and Kassin found a similar pattern of results with
handwriting evidence.137 These findings suggest that once people hear
that a defendant has confessed, their evaluations of subsequent evidence,
even something as powerful as DNA, may be distorted.
Unfortunately, the processes of mental contamination are not easy
to avoid. This is primarily because people not only have difficulty
detecting mental contamination, but even when they are aware that their
biases may be affecting their judgments, people often are not able to
recognize the impact of the biases and fully correct their judgments.138 In
a disputed-confession case, it is possible that one or more of these biases
is affecting an attorney’s decision-making concerning whether to take the
case to trial and what strategies they will employ at trial by biasing their
evaluations of the interrogation, confession, and other evidence in the
case.
VI. CURRENT STUDIES
The research reviewed shows that, when exposed to standard police
interrogation techniques, innocent people are vulnerable to confessing to
crimes they did not commit. Moreover, once a confession case goes to
trial, research suggests that the impact of a confession is so great that the
defendant stands little chance of being acquitted, even if there is little or
contradictory other evidence in the case. Furthermore, the research shows
that many of the safeguards set up to protect the innocent—including
DNA testing of evidence—may not be immune to the powerful effects of
a confession. Because attorneys are the intervening step between when
the confession is taken and the case verdict is read, it is crucial that both
their understanding of interrogations and confessions and their decisionmaking in disputed-confession cases be examined. Research has
indicated that confessions have biasing effects in the judgments of both
lay people and judges; it is plausible that attorneys will show the same
tendencies. Thus, prosecutors may be more likely to prosecute disputedconfession cases—even in the face of contradictory evidence—while
defense attorneys may be more likely to plead out disputed-confession
cases when compared to similar non-confession cases. The current
studies examine defense attorneys’ knowledge and perceptions of

136 Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can
Confessions Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 122, 124–25 (2009).
137 See Jeff Kukucka & Saul M. Kassin, Do Confessions Taint Perceptions of Handwriting
Evidence? An Empirical Test of the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 256,
258–65 (2014).
138 Wilson & Brekke, supra note 114, at 121–22.
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interrogations and confessions, as well as their decision-making in a
disputed-confession case.
Study 1 uses a survey of defense attorneys to assess both their
knowledge and perceptions about interrogations and confessions,
including Miranda comprehension, police officers’ abilities to detect
deception, and the ability to distinguish between true and false
confessions. In addition, it will assess their perception of the coerciveness
of numerous interrogation tactics ranging from minimally coercive
(asking the suspect to repeat his statement) to extremely coercive
(threatening the suspect with harm) and the likelihood that they elicit both
true and false confessions. Study 2 will vary the level of coercion under
which the confession was obtained as well as the presence or absence of
exculpatory DNA evidence to test if attorneys’ decisions are
contaminated by confession evidence, examine what factors influence
their decisions to go to trial with a disputed-confession case, and their
strategies at trial.
A.

Study 1

The first study surveys defense attorneys to assess their knowledge
about various aspects of interrogations and confessions such as Miranda
comprehension, police officers’ deception detection abilities, and the
ability to distinguish between true and false confessions. It also assesses
their perceptions of the coerciveness of a wide range of interrogation
tactics, ranging from minimally coercive (asking the suspect to repeat his
statement) to extremely coercive (threating the suspect with harm), and
the likelihood that they elicit both true and false confessions. We predict
that, compared to the general population, defense attorneys will be more
knowledgeable about police interrogation tactics, but that they will be
less informed about aspects outside of their typical legal education, such
as Miranda rights comprehension. Finally, we predict that they will
underestimate the ability of interrogation tactics to elicit false
confessions.
1.

Participants

Recruited via email for an online survey of “Perceptions of Police
Investigations,” fifty-six defense attorneys completed a survey designed
to assess both their perceptions about police interrogations, knowledge of
false-confession risk factors, and knowledge of false confessions in
general. As a comparison sample, 189 U.S. Citizen community members,
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, were recruited for a “Legal
System Survey.” Participation took approximately thirty minutes;
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attorney participants were compensated with thirty dollars cash for their
time, while community participants were compensated with fifty cents
cash for their time.
Attorney participants were predominantly White (82.1%), with an
equal gender distribution (51.8% male; 48.2% female). Participants
reported an average of 11.70 (SD = 11.79) years of experience
(range: 1–45). Participants reported practicing in five states (Florida,
Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont), with the
majority practicing in Massachusetts (55.36%) and Georgia (33.93%).
About half of the sample (53.6%) had served as lead council on at least
one disputed-confession case. Table 1 shows the full demographics for
the attorney participants:
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Study 1 Attorney Participants
(N = 56)
N
%
Mean
SD
Range
Sex
Male
29
51.8
Female
27
48.2
Race/Ethnicity
African American
3
5.4
Asian American
1
1.8
Hispanic/Latinx American
4
7.1
Multi-Racial
2
3.6
Native American/American
0
0
Indian
Non-Hispanic Caucasian
46
82.1
Other
0
0
State
Florida
3
5.4
Georgia
19
33.9
Massachusetts
31
55.4
New Hampshire
1
1.8
Vermont
2
3.6
Years Experience
11.70
11.79
1–45

Community participants were also predominantly White (83.6%),
with an equal gender distribution (52.4% male; 47.1% female).
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 68 (M = 39.92, SD = 13.75) and
lived in 38 different states. Table 2 shows the full demographics for the
community participants:
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Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Study 1 Community Participants
(N = 189)
N
%
Mean
SD
Range
Age
33.92
13.75
18–68
Sex
Male
99
52.4
Female
89
47.1
Other
1
.5
Race/Ethnicity
African American
10
5.3
Asian American
10
5.3
Hispanic/Latinx American
2
1.1
Multi-Racial
5
2.6
Native American/Indian
1
.5
American
Non-Hispanic Caucasian
158
83.6
Other
3
1.6
-

2.

Measures

Via Qualtrics.com, participants completed an eighty-item
questionnaire designed to assess both their perceptions and knowledge of
interrogations and confessions.
a. Perception
Perception Items. Perception items focused on three topics to assess
participants’ beliefs regarding specific interrogation tactics: (a) their
coerciveness (1 = not at all coercive, 7 = extremely coercive); (b) their
likelihood to elicit a true confession (1 = not at all likely, 7 = extremely
likely); and (c) their likelihood to elicit a false confession (1 = not at all
likely, 7 = extremely likely). The perception items were based on
questions used in previous juror-perception studies139 and techniques
recommended in popular police interrogation manuals,140 and ranged
from minimally coercive (e.g., asking the suspect to take a lie detector
test) to very coercive (e.g., beating or assaulting the suspect). Within each
subsection, items were presented in a random order. Table 3 shows the
full list of items and each group of participants’ average ratings of these
items:

139
140

See, e.g., Blandón-Gitlin et al., supra note 86, at 244; Leo & Liu, supra note 86, at 386.
See, e.g., INBAU ET AL., supra note 34, at 183–328.
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Table 3. Study 1 Participants’ Perceptions of Interrogation Tactics
Defense Attorneys
Community Members
Elicit True
Elicit False
Elicit True
Elicit False
Coercive
Coercive
Confession Confession
Confession Confession
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)

Actual or Threat of Violence
5.16 (2.09)

5.93 (1.48)

6.03 (1.48)

4.65 (1.81)

4.93 (1.67)

6.71 (.76)

5.00 (2.04)

5.70 (1.55)

5.76 (1.59)

4.48 (1.77)

4.80 (1.82)

6.82 (.81)
6.86 (.40)

5.09 (2.06)
5.25 (2.17)

5.98 (1.48)
6.25 (1.35)

5.94 (1.59)
6.17 (1.55)

4.66 (1.81)
4.82 (1.95)

4.84 (1.71)
5.31 (1.80)

6.25 (1.23)

5.27 (1.78)

4.98 (1.69)

5.42 (1.44)

4.54 (1.56)

3.95 (1.77)

6.38 (1.07)

5.46 (1.66)

5.00 (1.72)

5.40 (1.61)

4.68 (1.69)

4.08 (1.81)

6.46 (.99)

5.75 (1.47)

5.55 (1.57)

5.37 (1.69)

5.04 (1.60)

4.13 (1.79)

6.14 (1.37)

5.45 (1.50)

5.07 (1.66)

5.47 (1.59)

4.93 (1.59)

4.07 (1.78)

6.30 (.99)

5.32 (1.62)

5.32 (1.53)

5.04 (1.54)

5.08 (1.47)

3.88 (1.78)

6.36 (.92)

5.43 (1.63)

5.34 (1.60)

5.05 (1.49)

5.14 (1.40)

3.94 (1.85)

False Evidence
Giving suspects a lie detector test and falsely
telling them that the results indicate they are lying.
Confronting the suspect with false video
surveillance camera evidence.
Confronting the suspect with false DNA evidence.
Confronting the suspect with false fingerprints
evidence.
Promise of Leniency
Explicitly promising a more lenient charge if
suspect confesses.
Explicitly promising a more lenient sentence if
suspect confesses.
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Explicitly threatening suspects with physical
harm.
Implicitly or indirectly threatening suspects with
physical harm.
Threatening suspects with physical violence.
Physically beating or assaulting the suspect.

5.86 (1.12)

5.18 (1.53)

4.84 (1.73)

4.73 (1.49)

5.86 (1.12)

5.18 (1.53)

5.86 (1.12)

5.23 (1.47)

4.80 (1.70)

4.66 (1.50)

4.85 (1.44)

3.83 (1.76)

4.66 (1.50)

4.66 (1.50)

4.66 (1.50)

4.66 (1.50)

4.66 (1.50)

4.66 (1.50)

5.02 (1.47)

4.34 (1.52)

4.14 (1.63)

4.47 (4.49)

4.08 (4.14)

3.50 (1.78)

4.95 (1.53)

4.00 (1.56)

3.71 (1.59)

4.23 (1.57)

3.74 (1.65)

3.37 (1.73)

4.11 (1.64)

3.50 (1.62)

2.82 (1.70)

3.05 (1.75)

3.86 (1.71)

2.53 (1.68)

3.16 (1.76)

3.07 (1.78)

2.96 (1.81)

2.72 (1.85)

3.21 (1.75)

2.65 (1.62)

4.27 (1.86)

4.52 (1.63)

4.13 (1.75)

3.40 (2.03)

4.83 (1.68)

3.67 (1.77)
149

Implicitly suggesting a more lenient charge if
suspect confesses.
Implicitly suggesting a more lenient sentence if
suspect confesses.
Accusation and Confrontation
Repeatedly accusing a suspect of committing the
crime.
Repeatedly telling the suspect that his/her alibi is
false.
Repeatedly cutting off the suspect’s denials of
guilt.
Request and Presentation of Evidence
Asking the suspect to take a lie detector test.
Giving suspects a lie detector test and truthfully
telling them that the results are inconclusive.
Giving suspects a lie detector test and truthfully
telling them that the results indicate they are lying.
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Promise of Leniency (cont’d)

2019]

Table 3. Study 1 Participants’ Perceptions of Interrogation Tactics (cont’d)
Defense Attorneys
Community Members
Elicit True
Elicit False
Elicit True
Elicit False
Coercive
Coercive
Confession Confession
Confession Confession
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
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Perceptions. Defense attorneys rated fifteen out of eighteen tactics
as significantly more coercive than did community members.141 Items
that were not statistically significant were repeated accusation, repeatedly
saying the suspect’s alibi is false, and truthfully telling the suspect that
their polygraph results are inconclusive.142
Defense attorneys rated the majority of the tactics as equally likely
to elicit both true and false confessions from suspects.143 Unexpectedly,
defense attorneys rated both implicit and explicit threats of harm, as well
as actual violence, as more likely to elicit false confessions than true
confessions.144
Further, defense attorneys rated twelve out of eighteen tactics as
significantly more likely to elicit a false confession than did community
members.145 These twelve tactics included all of the false evidence ploys,
and implicit and explicit promises and threats. Defense attorneys also saw
false-evidence ploys and implicit and explicit promises and threats as
more likely to elicit true confessions than did community members.146
Table 3 shows all means.
b. Knowledge
Knowledge Items. Knowledge items served to assess participants’
knowledge of important psychological findings related to interrogations
and confessions. These topics include: (a) deceptive behaviors; (b)
deception detection; (c) suspects’ Miranda comprehension; (d)
distinguishing between true and false confessions; and (e) vulnerable
individuals. Participants answered two to four questions per category to
assess their knowledge. Questions were presented in a random order.
Some examples of statements presented include: “Police officers are
more skilled than the general public at detecting deception”; “Suspects
under age 16 can satisfactorily understand Miranda rights”; and “When
watching a videotaped statement given by a defendant, one can
distinguish between true and false confessions.” Participants then
estimated the role that false confessions play in wrongful convictions by
estimating: “Out of 100 cases of wrongful felony convictions, how many,
on average, are due in part to a false confession?” Table 4 shows a full
list of items and participants’ average ratings of these items:

141
142
143
144
145
146

All ps < .028.
All ps > .090.
All ps > .107.
All ps < .042.
All ps < .002.
All ps < .038.
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Table 4. Knowledge of Interrogation and Confession Issues
Defense
Community
Question147
Attorneys
Members
M (SD)
M (SD)
Deception Detection
Police officers are more skilled at detecting
3.14 (1.70)
4.76 (1.44)
deception than the general population.*
Properly trained individuals can detect
deception by observing a person’s body 3.89 (1.76)
5.40 (1.28)
language.*
How good are you at identifying when a
51.3%
40.0%
suspect is lying or telling the truth?**
(20.3)
(21.2)
Miranda Rights
The general population can satisfactorily
2.55 (1.41)
5.02 (1.44)
understand Miranda rights.*
Suspects under age 16 can satisfactorily
1.73 (1.07)
3.42 (1.56)
understand Miranda rights.*
Intellectually disabled suspects can
1.21 (.65)
2.40 (1.38)
satisfactorily understand Miranda rights.*
In general, what percentage of suspects
74.9%
38.25%
waive their Miranda rights?*
(15.8)
(24.6)
What percentage of guilty suspects waive
68.7%
28.8%
their Miranda rights?*
(18.4)
(19.7)
False Confessions
What percentage of innocent suspects waive
78.3%
44.8%
their Miranda rights?*
(19.7)
(29.7)
Out of 100 cases of wrongful felony
45.1%
29.5%
convictions, how many, on average, are due
(26.2)
(24.9)
in part to a false confession?
Juvenile suspects are more likely to falsely
5.77 (1.19)
5.45 (1.23)
confess than the average adult
Mentally ill suspects are more likely to
6.32 (1.01)
5.97 (1.29)
falsely confess than the average adult.**
Intellectually disabled suspects are more
likely to falsely confess than the average
6.30 (.97)
5.88 (1.22)
adult.**
When watching a videotaped statement given
by a defendant, people are able to distinguish 3.39 (1.49)
3.90 (1.24)
between true and false confessions.**
False confessions will not contain facts only
2.91 (1.65)
4.81 (1.54)
the true perpetrator could know.*
147 A single asterisk (*) indicates significant differences at p < .001. A double asterisk (**)
indicates significant differences at p < .05.
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False confessions will not contain vivid
details about the crime.*
I can distinguish between true and false
confessions.*
Jurors can distinguish between true and false
confessions.*
Judges can distinguish between true and false
confessions.*
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2.39 (1.36)

4.07 (1.70)

2.11 (1.09)

3.50 (1.31)

2.11 (1.09)

3.50 (1.31)

2.36 (1.26)

3.94 (1.37)

Knowledge. Regarding Miranda, a series of independent t-tests
showed that defense attorneys were less likely than community members
to think the general population, juvenile suspects, and intellectually
disabled suspects understood Miranda rights.148 Regarding the risk of
false confession, a series of independent t-tests showed that defense
attorneys were more likely than community members to think that
intellectually disabled and mentally ill suspects were at higher risk of
false confession.149 However, defense attorneys and community members
were equally likely to think that juveniles were at higher risk of false
confession.150
A series of independent t-tests showed that defense attorneys and
community members expressed similar confidence in their own ability to
distinguish true from false confessions,151 whereas community members
were more likely to think that judges and juries could distinguish between
true and false confessions than were defense attorneys.152 Similarly,
defense attorneys were less likely than community members to think that
false confessions lacked vivid details about the crime or that they
contained true details that only the true perpetrator could know.153 Table
4 shows all means.
B.

Study 2

The second study uses an experimental design to examine what
factors influence defense attorneys’ decisions to go to trial and what
strategies they employ at trial in disputed-confession cases. We
manipulate interrogation pressure and evidence strength to examine
defense attorneys’ trial predictions and strategies in disputed-confession
cases. We predict that defense attorneys will rate the high-pressure
148
149
150
151
152
153

All ps < .001.
All ps < .05.
p = .087.
t(243) = -.69, p = .49.
All ps < .001.
All ps < .001.
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interrogation as more coercive than the low-pressure interrogation, but
they will rate the defendants in the low- and high-pressure interrogations
equally likely to have committed the crime. We also predict that
participants will be equally likely to recommend a plea bargain in highand low-pressure interrogations. However, we expect evidence strength
to moderate this effect, such that when the physical evidence is
inconclusive, defense attorneys will be more swayed by the presence of
a confession than when it clearly suggests innocence. We also
hypothesize that participants will consider confession cases as having
stronger evidence of guilt and will predict a lower chance of winning—
regardless of the strength of the physical evidence—than denial cases.
We make no predictions about participants’ trial strategies, as those
questions were primarily exploratory in nature.
1.

Participants

Participants were 145 self-identified criminal defense attorneys
recruited via email for an online study of “Attorney Decision-Making.”
Participants were predominantly White (88.9%), with slightly more male
participants (58.1% male, 41.9% female). Participants reported an
average of 15.44 (SD = 12.43) years of experience (range: 0.67–54).
Participants reported practicing in thirty-four different states, with the
majority practicing in South Carolina (13.10%) and Virginia (12.41%).
About half of the sample (53.1%) had served as lead counsel on at least
one disputed-confession case. Table 5 shows the full demographics154:
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Some participants did not provide demographic information.
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Table 5. Demographic Characteristics of Study 2 Participants
N
%
Mean
SD
Range
Sex
Male
Female
Race/Ethnicity
African American
Asian American
Hispanic/Latinx American
Multi-Racial
Native American/American
Indian
Non-Hispanic Caucasian
Other
State
Alabama
California
Connecticut
Washington, DC
Florida
Georgia
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
North Carolina
New York
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Virginia
Years Experience

79
57

58.1
41.9

-

-

-

5
3
3
1

3.7
2.2
2.2
0.7

-

-

-

1

0.7

-

-

-

120
2

88.9
1.5

-

-

-

8
13
1
1
13
9
1
10
6
3
7
3
1
3
2
5
3
1
2
3
1
1
19
1
4
4
-

5.52
8.97
0.69
0.69
8.97
6.21
0.69
6.90
4.14
2.07
4.82
2.07
0.69
2.07
1.38
3.45
2.07
0.69
1.38
2.07
0.69
0.69
13.10
0.69
2.76
2.76
-

15.44

12.43

.67–54
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Participation took approximately forty minutes and participants received
a forty-dollar Amazon.com gift card for their time.
2.

Procedure and Study Design

All data were collected online via Qualtrics.com. Upon logging into
the website, participants consented to participating in a study and
indicated what type of attorney they were to ensure eligibility.
Participants were instructed that they would read a brief case summary
and answer some questions about their trial strategy and their perceptions
of the evidence. They were encouraged to take notes, as they would not
be able to go back during the study.
This study used an experimental design to test defense attorneys’
decision-making and trial strategies in a disputed-confession case.
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of six trial summaries in
a 3 (Confessions: Denial, Low Pressure, High Pressure) × 2 (Evidence:
Inconclusive, Exculpatory) factorial design. Although trial summaries
can create a somewhat artificial experience, the benefits of using an
experimental design in which we can control and isolate the effects of the
variables in question are key in initial studies of a topic.
3.

Study Materials

a. Case Summary
In each condition, participants read the same one-page case
summary, entitled People v. James Wilson. The summary described the
discovery of the victim, Mary Summers, who was raped and bludgeoned
to death in her apartment; her jewelry and credit cards were also missing.
Witnesses reported seeing a neighbor, the defendant James Wilson,
arguing with the victim several times in the weeks prior to the incident in
question. In all conditions, the police arrested Mr. Wilson and took him
to the station for questioning, where they noted that Wilson had a history
of heavy drinking and could not account for his whereabouts on the night
in question.
b. Confession Manipulation
By random assignment, participants read one of three accounts of
the interrogation. In the two confession conditions, the defendant
provided a written confession, modeled after a typical narrative
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confession155 that included a motive, crime details, and an apology. In the
denial condition, Wilson strongly denied—in writing—that he had
anything to do with the crime, stating he was at a party on the night in
question. In the low-pressure condition, the defendant confessed after
thirty minutes of interrogation. After confessing, he recanted his
confession, claiming he was innocent. A videotape of the interrogation
confirmed that the interrogating detectives did not threaten or mistreat the
defendant. In the high-pressure condition, the defendant was interrogated
for fifteen hours in a windowless room. After confessing, the defendant
recanted his confession, saying that he only confessed because the
interrogating detective repeatedly yelled at him and threatened him with
the death penalty while repeatedly unholstering his gun. A videotape of
the interrogation corroborated the defendant’s story.
c. Evidence Manipulation
By random assignment, participants read one of two results of DNA
testing. In the inconclusive condition, investigators tried to preform DNA
testing on semen recovered from the victim, but no semen was present,
only spermicide suggesting that the perpetrator used a condom. In the
exculpatory condition, investigators performed DNA testing on the
semen recovered from the victim, but the DNA profile did not match that
of the defendant. In all conditions, participants read that hairs found in
the victim’s grasp were tested against the defendant’s hair, but the test
results were inconclusive, and that a search of Wilson’s apartment did not
find either the jewelry or Summer’s credit cards.
4.

Measures

After reading the case summary, participants answered a series of
questions to assess their perceptions of the evidence and their trial
strategy.
a. Perceptions of the Case
First, participants indicated whether or not they would try to
negotiate a plea deal for the defendant and why. Overall, participants
would try to negotiate a plea bargain 40% of the time. Neither confession,
evidence strength, nor the interaction term were significant predictors of
whether the participants would negotiate a plea bargain156:

155 See generally Sara C. Appleby et al., Police-Induced Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of
Their Content and Impact, 19 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 111, 115–16 (2012) (discussing the results of
a survey of the contents of false confessions); Garrett, supra note 1, at 1066.
156 -2LL = 193.36, χ2(5, N = 149) = 8.27, p = .142.
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Figure 1. Would you try to negotiate a plea bargain?

For participants who said they would not try to negotiate a plea deal, the
majority cited a lack of evidence (70%); only 17% said they would not
try to negotiate a plea because the confession was coerced. For those that
would try to negotiate a plea, the majority said they wanted to present
their client with options (70%); only 11% said they would try to negotiate
a plea because of the confession. In sum, defense attorneys endorsed
negotiating a plea bargain equally across cases, regardless of
interrogation pressure or evidence strength, with very few indicating the
confession as their reason for doing so (or not).
Next, on a scale of 0% to 100%, participants rated the likelihood that
the defendant committed the crime. Participants rated the defendant in
the low-pressure (M = 29.66, SD = 24.16) and high-pressure (M = 27.16,
SD = 21.69) conditions equally likely to have committed the crime
(p = .822). Likelihood ratings for the denial condition (M = 18.72,
SD = 14.83) were significantly lower than the low-pressure condition
(p = .027), but not significantly different from the high-pressure
condition (p = .129).157 Participants rated the defendant as more likely to
have committed the crime in the inconclusive condition (M = 30.94,
SD = 22.64) than in the exculpatory condition (M = 20.50,
SD = 18.62).158 There was not a significant confession by evidencestrength interaction.159 In sum, even though they did not affect the

F(2, 130) = 3.70, p = .027, ηp2 = .05.
158 F(1, 130) = 8.13, p = .005, ηp2 = .06.
159 F(2, 130) = 1.89, p = .156.
157

158

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2019

likelihood of negotiating a plea, both interrogation pressure and evidence
strength affected defense attorneys’ perceptions of guilt.
Finally, on a scale of 0% to 100%, participants rated their likelihood
of winning the case at trial. Participants predicted a lower likelihood of
winning in both the low-pressure (M = 55.41, SD = 22.96) and high
pressure (M = 61.42, SD = 20.47) cases than in the denial case
(M = 74.07, SD = 18.13).160 The two confession cases did not differ from
each other (p = .336).161 Evidence strength did not affect predicted
likelihood of winning,162 nor was there a significant confession by
evidence-strength interaction for likelihood of winning163:
Figure 2. Likelihood of Winning

In sum, defense attorneys are aware that the presence of a confession
decreases their likelihood of winning, even when elicited by coercive
tactics.
b. Trial Strategy
Participants were asked to imagine the defendant elected to take the
case to trial and to describe their general trial strategy in their own words.
In the confession conditions, the three most frequent strategies suggested
were to argue a general lack of evidence (29%), argue a lack of physical
evidence (28%), and to dispute the confession (24%). Table 6 shows a
detailed breakdown of strategies:

All ps < .013.
F(2, 137) = 9.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .13.
162 F(1, 137) = .44, p = .511.
163 F(2, 137) = .08, p = .928.
160
161

2019]

DEFENSE ATTORNEY DECISIONS IN CONFESSION CASES

Table 6. What is your general trial strategy?
General Trial Strategy
N
No Evidence
29
No Physical Evidence
28
Discount Confession
24
Attack Policing and Prosecution
17
Attack Interrogation
10
Hire Confession Expert
6
Try to Suppress Confession
6
Argue Confession Not Corroborated
4
Find Alibi
2

159

%
29
28164
24
17
10
6
6
4
2

Notably, interrogation pressure did not affect the frequency with which
participants suggested strategies.165 The presence of exculpatory DNA
evidence, however, did affect the frequency with which participants
suggested arguing a lack of physical evidence.166
Additionally, participants in the confession conditions were asked
how they would address the defendant’s claim that he gave a false
confession. In both the high- and low-pressure interrogation conditions,
the most frequently suggested strategy was to argue a lack of evidence
(42.5%). The second most common response—in both the high- and lowpressure interrogation conditions—was no response (34.5%). Across
both confession conditions, only 18% of participants suggested hiring a
confession expert. Table 7 shows a breakdown of strategies by
interrogation pressure:
Table 7. How would you address the confession?
N
High-Pressure Strategy
Lack of Evidence
19
No Response
15
Confession Expert
8
Low-Pressure Strategy
Lack of Evidence
23
No Response
19
Confession Expert
10

%
42
33
17
43
36
19

In sum, for general trial strategy and confession-specific strategies,
defense attorneys routinely failed to suggest using confession-specific
interventions in court.
Main effect of DNA, -2LL (108.16), χ2 (3, N = 99) = 9.77, p = .021.
165 All ps > .414.
166 -2LL (108.16), χ2 (3, N = 99) = 9.77, p = .021.
164
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c. Perceptions of the Confession
Finally, participants in the confession conditions evaluated the
interrogation of the defendant and his confession. First, participants
indicated whether they thought the confession was voluntary or not
voluntary. Overall, 84% of participants rated the defendant’s confession
as not voluntary; more granularly, 78% of participants in the low-pressure
condition and 90.9% of participants in the high-pressure condition said
the confession was not-voluntary. This difference was not statistically
significant.167 Evidence strength also did not affect voluntariness
ratings.168 In sum, defense attorneys viewed confessions as not voluntary
regardless of interrogation pressure or evidence strength.
Next, on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = not at all, 10 = very), participants
rated their confidence in their voluntariness rating. The two measures
were then combined to create a scaled measure of voluntariness
(-10 = not voluntary, 10 = voluntary). Participants in the high-pressure
condition (M = -7.20, SD = 4.30) were more confident that the confession
was not voluntary than participants in the low-pressure condition
(M = -4.76, SD = 5.85).169 Evidence strength did not affect scaled
confidence ratings,170 nor was there an interrogation-pressure by
evidence-strength interaction.171 In sum, although their dichotomous
voluntary judgments did not differ, the more sensitive measure—scaled
voluntary confidence—showed distinctions in voluntariness ratings.
Then, on a 1 to 10 scale (1 = not at all, 10 = very), participants evaluated
the coerciveness of the interrogation. The high-pressure condition
(M = 9.02, SD = 1.51) was rated as significantly more coercive than the
low-pressure condition (M = 7.18, SD = 1.97, p < .001); the low-pressure
condition was rated significantly more coercive than the denial condition
(M = 4.56, SD = 2.02, p < .001).172 Evidence strength had no effect on
coerciveness ratings,173 nor was there a significant interrogation-pressure
by evidence-strength interaction174:

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

χ2 (3, N = 94) = 2.91, p = .088, φ = -.18.
χ2 (3, N = 94) = .21, p = .644, φ = -.05.
F(1, 90) = 5.19, p = .025, ηp2 = .05.
F(1, 90) = .35, p = .558.
F(1, 90) = .16, p = .69.
F(2, 131) = 71.66, p < .00, ηp2 = .52.
F(1, 131) = 1.06, p = .306.
F(2, 131) = 2.21, p = .114.
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Figure 3. Coerciveness of Interrogation

In sum, defense attorneys were able to accurately distinguish low- and
high-pressure interrogations.
Finally, participants were asked to predict how likely jurors would
be to rate the confession as voluntary and how likely jurors would be to
believe the confession, both on 1-to-10 scales (1 = not at all, 10 = very).
Regarding voluntariness, participants in the low-pressure condition
(M = 6.56, SD = 2.23) predicted jurors would be more likely to say the
confession was voluntary than participants in the high-pressure condition
(M = 5.11, SD = 2.12).175 Evidence strength did not affect voluntariness
predictions,176 nor was there a interrogation-pressure by evidencestrength interaction.177 Regarding believability, neither interrogation
pressure,178 evidence strength,179 nor the interrogation-pressure by
evidence-strength interaction180 affected participants’ predictions of
jurors’ believing the confession. In sum, defense attorneys expected
jurors to be equally likely to believe the defendants’ confession regardless
of interrogation pressure or evidence strength.

175
176
177
178
179
180

F(1, 90) = 10.07, p = .002, ηp2 = .10.
F(1, 90) = .95, p = .331.
F(1, 90) = .49, p = .488.
F(1, 90) = 2.11, p = .150.
F(1, 90) = .02, p = .888.
F(1, 90) = .01, p = .909.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
A.

Summary of Results

In his 2012 article Why Confessions Trump Innocence, prominent
confessions researcher Saul Kassin hypothesized that the presence of a
confession may lead defense counsel to feel pessimistic, maybe even
helpless, inadvertently reducing the quality of the defense provided to the
defendant and increasing the rate of guilty pleas in confession cases.181
This hypothesis was based on anecdotal evidence and limited archival
data. For example, an analysis of the first 273 DNA exonerations showed
that false-confession cases were more likely to involve bad defense
lawyering (9.09%) than non-confession cases (3.38%).182 Additionally,
analysis of Innocence Project cases showed that false-confession cases
were four times more likely to lead to a guilty plea than non-confession
cases.183 The current studies sought to test these hypotheses empirically
by examining defense attorneys’ knowledge of false-confessions issues
and their trial strategies in potential false-confession cases.
Overall, results suggest that defense attorneys are more
knowledgeable about false confessions than community members and
that the presence of a confession does not increase their likelihood of
trying to negotiate a plea bargain for their client. Results also showed that
defense attorneys are aware of the power of confession evidence,
predicting a lower chance of winning confession cases compared to the
denial case. When asked about their trial strategies, however, the results
painted a different picture. As far as their general trial strategy, even in
the presence of a confession, defense attorneys reported being more likely
to focus on the lack of evidence or lack of physical evidence; only
approximately one-fourth of participants suggested they would try to
discount the confession. Similarly, when asked specifically how they
would address the confession, participants again said they would focus
on the lack of evidence (42.5%) or simply did not answer the question
(34.5%). Only 18% of participants suggested calling a confession expert.

181 Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 438–39
(2012).
182 Saul. M. Kassin & Jeff Kukucka, Confession Errors as “Structural Defects”, Poster
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, San Juan, P.R. (2012),
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B75_hDMNaiYeeExvUjB4YTNlTXM [https://perma.cc/PZE47DL8].
183 Allison D. Redlich, False Confessions, False Guilty Pleas: Similarities and Differences, in
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS 49, 60 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A.
Meissner eds., 2010).
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These results support initial findings from evaluations of attorneys’
strategies in eyewitness cases.184
B.

Limitations

The current studies are limited in two ways. First, attorney
participants were recruited via email, likely creating a response bias.
Although we made no mention of interrogations and confessions in
recruitment materials, the kinds of people who respond to email surveys
are inherently different than those who do not.185 Thus, these studies
should be replicated with a more representative sample of attorneys for
generalizability. Second, in Study 2, the materials are brief and create an
artificial situation in which participants were limited in their access to
case information. It is well documented, however, that many attorneys
have limited time with their clients before their first arraignment 186 or
only receive discovery from prosecutors a few days before trial.187
Nevertheless, replicating these studies by giving participants access to
more extensive information is warranted. Given that this is the first study
of defense attorneys’ decision-making in disputed-confession cases, we
believe that, in spite of these limitations, the data make a valuable
contribution to the literature.
C.

Future Research

Unfortunately, we do not have data on why participants are more
focused on a general lack of evidence than confession-specific
interventions. Perhaps defense attorneys are concerned that focusing
attention on the confession will make it harder for jurors to discount. Or,
perhaps, defense attorneys are concerned that focusing attention on the
confession will cause prosecutors to redouble their efforts to prove the
confession is true. Future research should examine not only defense
See, e.g., Mumby, supra note 102, at 56.
BETH MORLING, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY: EVALUATING A WORLD OF
INFORMATION 187 (2d ed., 2015).
186 Cf., e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, &
POSTLETHWAITE & NETTERVILLE, THE LOUISIANA PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE LOUISIANA
DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 20 (2017), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
louisiana_project_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/64B2-6JDN] (explaining “the Louisiana public
defense system is currently deficient 1,406 FTE attorneys” and “only has the capacity to handle 21
percent of the workload” to be able to “provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant
to prevailing professional norms in Louisiana”).
187 See Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal
Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 288 (2016).
184
185
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attorneys’ trial strategies in a variety of potential wrongful-conviction
cases, but their motives behind their strategies. Additionally, future
research should examine the effectiveness of these strategies (e.g.,
focusing on lack of evidence versus confession interventions, or both) to
provide defense attorneys with evidence-based approaches to securing
their innocent client’s acquittal. Research shows that the presence of a
confession tends to lead to corroboration inflation (i.e., the tendency for
a confession to make ambiguous evidence look more incriminating), thus
it may be necessary for defense attorneys to focus on both the problems
with the confession and the problems with the other evidence. Finally,
because prosecutors hold the majority of the power in the criminal justice
system, research should also examine prosecutors’ knowledge of
confession issues and trial strategies in disputed-confession cases to
better understand what factors affect their decisions to drop, plead, or try
a disputed-confession case.
D.

Recommendations for Practice

False confessions are a major contributing factor in wrongfulconviction cases. Consequently, researchers have devoted a significant
amount of resources towards understanding why people confess to crimes
they did not commit as well as why people so readily believe confessions,
even when it is not logically appropriate to do so, such as when the crimescene DNA does not match the confessor. The results of this body of
research are clear: the standard police interrogation is inherently coercive,
even for psychologically health adults, and, due to the persuasive power
of confession evidence, once a suspect confesses, she is almost certain to
be convicted. Psycho-legal researchers regularly proposed two
safeguards to limit the number of false confessors wrongfully convicted:
videotaping interrogations from beginning to end188 and using expert
testimony in court.189 Early studies on the effectiveness of these
safeguards are promising.190 Given the tremendous power that confession
evidence has over triers of fact, however, more interventions are likely
needed; hence our focus on attorneys’ knowledge of false confessions
Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 25–27.
Brian Cutler et al., Expert Testimony on Interrogation and False Confession, 82 UMKC L.
REV. 589, 621–22 (2014).
190 See, e.g., Kelsey S. Henderson & Lora M. Levett, Can Expert Testimony Sensitize Jurors to
Variations in Confession Evidence?, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 638, 647–48 (2016); Saul M. Kassin
et al., Does Video Recording Inhibit Crime Suspects? Evidence From a Fully Randomized Field
Experiment, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 45, 49–52 (2019); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Reports of
Mock Suspect Interrogations: A Test of Accuracy and Perception, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 230,
240–41 (2017).
188
189
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and trial strategies in disputed-confession cases. Attorneys are the key
intervening step between confession and conviction; thus, it is crucial that
we increase efforts to educate both defense attorneys and prosecutors
about key interrogation and confession issues. Moreover, it is paramount
for psychologists and criminal attorneys to come together to create
evidence-based practices for reducing wrongful convictions191 by testing
the effectiveness of key confession interventions in pre-trial hearings and
at trial. Finally, one reason why research on attorney decision-making
lags behinds research on jury decision-making is difficulty in recruiting
attorney participants relative to community participants.192 Thus, is it also
import that psycho-legal researchers and practicing attorneys work
together to not only identify key research questions regarding attorney
decision-making, but also identify strategies for obtaining attorney
participants.

191 See CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT : LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (Brian L.
Cutler ed., 2012).
192 See Edkins, supra note 99, at 417; Pezdek & O’Brien, supra note 89, at 237.

